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those goals. William Pitt was clearly important, but not to the extent previously 
portrayed in most historical writing. Following the ascension of George III and 
the promotion of Lord Bute, Pitt's views hardened over the terms for peace with 
France. After five months of acrimonious debate, Pitt resigned, but the war 
continued. Middleton ends his study here, but includes an appendix which 
details the historiography of William Pitt since the 18th century and reveals his 
own presuppositions in creating this superb account. 
As modern communications have allowed the world to grow smaller, a 
cross-fertilization between European and North American historians has 
provided new stress on the links and similarities in human experience on two 
continents. The influence of the hereditarian interpetation has worked in a 
different way in history than in psychology. In history, recent work has only 
shifted the balance of interpretation in one direction, but without obliterating 
arguments for the distinctiveness of some elements in the Canadian past. As 
social history has matured, it has come to assume the larger intellectual world 
view once associated with the military historians of the colonial period. The time 
appears ripe for a new synthesis that will unite these diverse strains into an 
integrated history of New France. 
TERRY CROWLEY 
Twentieth Century Newfoundland Politics: 
Some Recent Literature 
W H I L E THERE ARE MORE SCHOLARS AT work in the field of Newfoundland 
history than was once the case, their number is not large. For one of the group to 
attempt a review article is perhaps foolhardy, and throughout the preparation of 
this piece I have been reminded of the words of D.W. Prowse as he embarked on 
the section of his history dealing with Newfoundland in his own time. It was the 
most difficult part of his subject, he wrote, for "whilst endeavouring to write a 
true history of the period, I have had also to walk, like Agag before Saul, 
delicately, in order to avoid offence".1 He went on to deliver an opinionated 
account of the later 19th century which reflected accurately his Liberal and 
nationalist views. Tact did not prove to be his strong suit. 
Prowse was an admirer of Robert Bond, premier from 1900 to 1909, who 
placed great importance on — some might say was obsessed by — Newfoundland's 
1 D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign Records 
(London, 1895), pp. 481-2. 
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status within the British Empire. It was Bond who asserted the colony's right to 
negotiate an independent reciprocity treaty with the USA, and who had the 
temerity to wage a tariff war against Canada and to harass American fishing 
vessels in Newfoundland waters. His assertiveness came to little in the end, but 
the record of his activities proved of considerable importance to lawyers retained by 
the provincial government to put together Newfoundland's case for control of 
offshore seabed resources. Like the Labrador boundary case (1927),2 the 
offshore litigation generated a substantial amount of historical research. The 
Newfoundland government alone compiled ten volumes of documents to 
support the factum submitted to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in 1982, 
and the factum itself consisted largely of "A Summary of Significant Events in 
the Evolution of Newfoundland's Separate International Personality" between 
1855, when the colony instituted responsible government, and 1949.3 One of the 
province's major arguments was that prior to confederation Newfoundland 
possessed sufficient status in international law "to be directly endowed with all 
the rights attributed by international law to a coastal state in the seabed and 
subsoil adjacent to its coasts", and one of the lawyers involved, William C. 
Gilmore, has now summarised a large chunk of this material in Newfoundland 
and Dominion Status. The External Affairs Competence and International Law 
Status of Newfoundland, 1855-1934 (Toronto, Carswell, 1988). 
In the first section, Gilmore argues that prior to 1914 Newfoundland was on 
the same footing as the other future dominions with reference to foreign affairs 
and the treaty-making power, and that general developments towards autonomy 
were "due in no small part to the efforts of successive Newfoundland governments" 
(p.44). During the first world war the colony's prime minister was a member of 
the Imperial War Cabinet, but once the fighting was over the colony's status 
seemed to slip. It was denied separate representation in the delegation to the 
peace conference, did not sign the treaty, and was not named to the League of 
Nations, though entitled to apply for admission. Gilmore shows that Newfound-
land was excluded from full participation in 1919 as a result of diplomatic rather 
than legal factors, and holds that its status was unchanged.4 But these events 
marked the start of some controversy over the country's status. Because it never 
joined the League and was content to leave its external affairs in the hands of the 
2 For a good summary, see Richard Budgel and Michael Staveley, The Labrador Boundary 
(Happy Valley-Goose Bay, 1987). 
3 In the Matter of Section 6 of The Judicature Act, RSN 1970 c. 187, as amended. And in the 
Matter of a Reference by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council concerning the Mineral and other 
Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf appurtenant to the Province of Newfoundland. 
Factum of the Attorney General of Newfoundland. Three parts, 1982. 
4 For an extended discussion, see W.C. Gilmore, "Newfoundland and the Paris Peace Conference, 
1919", British Journal of Canadian Studies, 1, 2 (1986), pp. 282-301. 
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British government, some came to believe that Newfoundland's status was lesser 
than that of the other dominions. Gilmore emphasises that Newfoundland was 
covered by the Balfour Declaration (1926) and the Statute of Westminster 
(1931), and argues that its lack of international activity did not create a juridically 
significant distinction between itself and other dominions. He thinks that 
Newfoundland in fact satisfied the "highly elastic" criteria for statehood at least 
until 1934. The prickly question of the country's status under Commission of 
Government he has left for a future publication. The province argued in its 
factum that the institution of Commission government did not deprive New-
foundland of its status as an international person, a position with which the 
province's Court of Appeal was prepared to agree, but not the Supreme Court of 
Canada.5 
Gilmore has made a useful contribution to the literature on the evolution of 
dominion status, and his book is the only work in existence on Newfoundland's 
constitutional history. As such it is a work of value and significance, no matter 
that there is no field so much out of fashion as constitutional history, apparently 
abandoned to the lawyers — and Newfoundland and Dominion Status is very 
much a lawyer's book. Gilmore is concerned to define as much as he is to explain, 
and his questions and themes are not those of the historian. His question is, 
"What was Newfoundland's precise status in 1933?" Ours would probably be, 
"Why was Newfoundland bankrupt in 1933?" None of the books under review 
here provides a direct answer to the latter question, but of direct relevance is the 
late Ian McDonald's "To Each His Own": W.F. Cooker and the Fishermen's 
Protective Union in Newfoundland Politics, 1908-1925 (St. John's, Institute for 
Social and Economic Research, 1987). An edited and abridged version of 
McDonald's 1971 London University Ph.D. thesis, this work focuses closely on 
the colony's political world from the founding of the FPU in 1908 to the end of 
its political activity and Coaker's retirement as president. The latter is presented 
very much as the tragic hero, and his opponents receive less than sympathetic 
treatment. Nevertheless, this is the fullest available account of the FPU to date, 
and it is an indispensable companion volume to S.J.R. Noel's Politics in New-
foundland (Toronto, 1971), which remains the standard work on the period. 
Particularly valuable are McDonald's accounts of the politics of the first world 
war and after,6 and of Coaker's attempt, when Minister of Marine and Fisheries 
5 W.C. Gilmore, "Newfoundland Offshore Mineral Rights", Marine Policy, 7 (1983), pp. 175-96; 
and "The Newfoundland Continental Shelf Dispute in the Supreme Court of Canada", Marine 
Policy, 8 (1984), pp. 323-9; "Aspects of United Kingdom Treaty Practice with respect to 
Newfoundland, 1926-1934", Canadian Yearbook of International Law, XXIV (1986), pp. 
213-46. 
6 Other recent works on the first world war period are P.R. O'Brien, "The Newfoundland Patriotic 
Association: the Administration of the War Effort, 1914-1918", M.A. thesis, Memorial 
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after 1919, to reform the fishery by government regulation. Coaker's remarkable 
crusade challenged the colony's mercantile elite and the churches, those twin 
conservative pillars of the status quo. He fought for social, political and economic 
reform in the interests of rural workers, but found himself checked by regionalism, 
sectarianism, the lack of political experience of both himself and his followers, 
and a severe post-war recession that vitiated any attempt to persuade the fish 
merchants to set their house in order. McDonald's discussion of the FPU's 
failure illuminates our understanding of the wider problems that racked the 
country as it lurched towards bankruptcy, and a crisis that prompted the elite to 
cry nostra culpa, and welcome the suspension of responsible government — a 
welcome in which Coaker joined.7 
Peter Neary's important new book, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic 
World, 1929-1949 (Kingston and Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1988) begins in the last years of the country's independence. Neary's purpose at 
this point, however, is not so much to explain Newfoundland's collapse as to 
account for the institution of Commission of Government, the "noble experi-
ment" (p. 74) which is his subject. Thus his main contribution to our knowledge 
of the 1929-34 period, and a valuable one, is his account of the making of the 
1933 royal commission report. This shows quite clearly that the royal commission 
"acted virtually as an extension of the normal Whitehall government machinery" 
(p. 41), in that its central recommendations with reference to the conversion of 
the Newfoundland debt and the suspension of responsible government had their 
origins with British officialdom. The commission's job was to provide the 
justifications and sell the policy to the Newfoundlanders. Neary then turns to the 
Commission of Government, concerned that its period in office (1934-1949) be 
studied for itself, and not merely as a prelude to the drama of confederation. This 
is entirely proper, particularly as the Commission has, on the whole, received a 
bad press. It deserves fair assessment. 
The Commission period falls roughly into three sections — 1934-39, when the 
new government had to face the problems posed by the Depression; 1939-45, 
University, 1982; and CA. Sharpe, "The 'Race of Honour': An Analysis of Enlistments and 
Casualties in the Armed Forces of Newfoundland, 1914-1918", Newfoundland Studies, 4, 1 
(1988), pp. 27-56. 
7 On the FPU, see also Barbara Neis, "A Sociological Analysis of the Factors Responsible for the 
Regional Distribution of the Fishermen's Protective Union in Newfoundland", M.A. thesis, 
Memorial University, 1980; and R.H. Cuff, comp, and ed., A Coaker Anthology (St. John's, 
Creative Publishers, 1986). Two reprints are also valuable: W.F. Coaker, ed., Twenty Years of the 
Fishermen's Protective Union of Newfoundland from 1909 —1929... (1930, reprinted St. John's, 
Creative Publishers, 1984); more difficult to find is Past, Present and Future. Being a Series of 
Articles Contributed to the Fishermen's Advocate, 1932, by Sir W.F. Coaker, K.B.E., together 
with Notes of a Trip to Greece, 1932, and a Foreword by J.H. Scammell (Port Union, 1932; 
reprinted privately, n.d.). 
Review Essays/Notes critiques 185 
when it presided over the diplomatic problems and economic prosperity brought 
by the war; and 1945-49 when, as a caretaker administration, it held the fort 
during the constitutional debates and the process of union with Canada. Neary's 
detailed treatment of the first period shows how limited was the Commission's 
freedom of action. The British government asserted firm control over policy and 
finances, and made it clear that it wanted as little trouble as possible. This 
attitude made it impossible for the Commission effectively to challenge entrenched 
local interests, thus blunting the effort to reform both the educational system 
and the fisheries. Neary shows there were significant achievements in some 
areas, but the caution and conservatism inherent in the system conflicted with an 
appreciation that if Newfoundland was to have a chance of becoming permanently 
self-supporting again, more radical reform was needed. Ambitious long-term 
reconstruction plans were proposed in 1936 and more importantly in 1938-9 (by 
J.H. Gorvin), but neither was implemented; and if either had been, the Dominions 
Office would no doubt have had to face the fury of a local elite which had seen in 
the Commission system the guarantee of its safety. 
The outbreak of war saved the Commission and the Dominions Office from 
the necessity of finding a solution to fundamental problems which they, like the 
pre-1934 responsible governments, had failed to solve. War brought Canadian 
and American bases and garrisons, a military occupation which created a 
dramatic if artificial prosperity. It is with the outbreak of hostilities that David 
MacKenzie begins Inside the North Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance 
of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1945 (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1986). Though Neary curiously omits this book from his bibliography, it is 
essential reading. MacKenzie, being primarily concerned with Canadian policy, 
relies mainly on Canadian sources. Neary is primarily concerned with British 
policy, and therefore relies mainly on British and Newfoundland government 
records. In this way the two books, both of which cover much of the same 
ground, provide complementary perspectives, though Neary necessarily has the 
wider focus. Both authors, for instance, discuss the establishment of Canadian 
and American bases, the Goose Bay agreement and the problems of command. 
Both discuss at length the evolution of policy towards Newfoundland's post-war 
future. 
In Newfoundland this remains a sensitive subject. An older generation still 
debates the events of 40 years ago, and many of its members retain a sense of 
affront and outrage at what occurred. Ray Guy touched on this nerve in a 
column written in the early 1970s, "A conversation with an older person who 
passed away in August 1943, out Home" — that is, Arnold's Cove, Placentia 
Bay.8 "Did Billy last long?" asks the deceased. 
8 Ray Guy, You May Know Them As Sea Urchins, Ma'am (St. John's, 1975), pp. 22-3. 
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Oh, yes, sir. He rallied after that and he was great and smart and only 
passed away, I think it was, the year beforc.no, in the summer...two years 
before Confederation. They put his pipe and a bottle of rum in the box 
along with him. 
Eh, my son? 
His pipe, sir and a bottle.... 
Confederation? 
Yes, Confederation. Joined to Canada, it was in 1949. April Fool's Day. 
You know, upalong, Canada. We were joined on. 
The Commission done it. 
I don't think so, sir, altogether.... 
Then how many was there killed? 
So far as I know sir, there was no one killed. There was only a lot of talk all 
the time, and swearing. When it came about they put the flag down to 
half-mast but there was no one killed. 
No one? 
No, sir. No one...so far as I know. 
No one. 
It is a sensitivity which was dramatically demonstrated when Phillip McCann, 
better known as an historian of education, gave a lecture to the Newfoundland 
Historical Society in 1983 entitled "Confederation Revisited: New Light on 
British Policy". McCann had been at work in the Public Record Office, and was 
the first scholar to present some of the contents of the newly available 1940s files. 
He outlined the evolution of British policy, and concluded that J.R. Smallwood's 
campaigns had to be seen as part of a larger whole. This was fair enough, but 
McCann went further and asserted that, as anticonfederates had long suspected, 
there had been a plot of a sort in that "Confederation was engineered by the 
British, almost entirely in secret and largely by the Treasury. Newfoundland — 
and Labrador in particular — were used as pawns in a deal with the Canadians". 
Smallwood was present at the lecture, flanked by a brace of veterans from the 
confederation wars. At the end, the chairman invited him to comment, and the 
Only Living Father rose up in wrath. I cannot, he said, "for a moment accept 
[McCann's] very naive, unscholarly inference, implications and hints that 
Britain engineered Newfoundland into Confederation". It was a "cockeyed 
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story, this silly, stupid story...the last word in idiocy". "Confederation was 
engineered by 52 Newfoundlanders out of every 100.... I thought that was a 
pretty good job of engineering. I had a little to do with persuading them to do it. 
The British Government had nothing to do with persuading them, the Canadian 
Government had nothing to do with it". And then, the lowest blow of all, 
Smallwood informed McCann that he couldn't hope to understand since he had 
only been in Newfoundland for 16 years.9 
While McCann's conclusion was overstated, what really upset Smallwood 
was the challenge to the confederate orthodoxy which he himself had created. In 
this version, Smallwood reads about the forthcoming National Convention in a 
Montreal newspaper, becomes a born-again confederate, returns to Newfound-
land and, as a result of his tireless work and skilful manoeuvers, brings about 
confederation.10 There is, of course, truth in this interpretation, for Smallwood 
played a centrally important and indispensable role on the confederate side. But 
conclusions aside, McCann was on the right track, as Peter Neary was soon to 
confirm, first in a research note in Acadiensis, then in a 1985 article in New-
foundland Studies,n and now in his book. Neary, however, rejects any suggestion 
that there was a plot: that the British and Canadian governments were thinking 
about Newfoundland's future should come as no surprise, and it should not be 
forgotten that in the end it was Newfoundland voters who made the choice. 
A classic exposition of the plot theory of confederation is provided, however, 
by Bren Walsh in More Than a Mere Majority: The Story of Newfoundland's 
Confederation with Canada (St. John's, Breakwater, 1985). Walsh was a young 
reporter in the late 1940s, and in retirement has returned to an obvious obsession. 
He was convinced before he began his research, he says, and has now found it amply 
proven, that a plot existed "to manoeuvre Newfoundland into Confederation by 
fair means or foul...it was much worse than I thought. Where I was looking for 
venality on the part of two, three or four principal players, what I believe I 
uncovered was a deliberate, calculated design, fermenting over a decade or 
more, between Britain's Dominions Office and Canada's Department of 
External Affairs", (p.6) What Walsh found, of course, was a large amount of 
correspondence in which officials speculated and negotiated, and evidence of 
Anglo-Canadian discussions in which confederation was actively debated, but 
9 McCann's lecture was not published. Accounts of this celebrated meeting can be found in the 
Evening Telegram (St. John's), 14 January 1983; the Daily News (St. John's), 15 January 1983; 
and Maclean's Magazine, 31 January 1983. 
10 J.R. Smallwood, "The Story of Confederation" in Smallwood, ed., The Book of Newfoundland, 
Vol. Ill (St. John's, 1967), pp. 4-34; and I Chose Canada (Toronto, 1973). 
11 P. Neary, "Newfoundland's Union with Canada: Conspiracy or Choice?", Acadiensis 12, 2 
(Spring 1983), pp 110-9; "Great Britain and the Future of Newfoundland, 1939-45", Newfound-
land Studies 1,1 (1985), pp. 29-56. 
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such evidence does not support a conspiracy theory.12 Though Walsh was unable 
to prove his thesis, the book is nevertheless an interesting record of anticonfeder-
ate opinions that have been in existence for 40 years, and it shows how deeply 
wounded were many Newfoundlanders by what they deemed to be a shabby and 
unseemly proceeding. Smallwood and Walsh, indeed, represent two sides of the 
same contemporary coin. 
What actually happened was altogether more prosaic than Walsh would have 
us believe. The war made Newfoundland technically self-supporting, and in 
1942, with Clement Attlee at the Dominions Office, the British began to turn 
their thoughts to Newfoundland's future. Understanding that Newfoundlanders 
were divided on the subject of their constitutional future (but believing that 
confederation was not feasible), the British decided that after the war a national 
convention would be convened to examine the country's condition and the 
constitutional options. In the meantime, the Commission would develop a 
comprehensive reconstruction plan to be funded by Britain, which, if imple-
mented, would act as a bridge between the Commission system and full inde-
pendence: for the British feared, and with reason, that if Newfoundland returned 
immediately to responsible government its financial future would be uncertain 
at best. The reconstruction plan, submitted by the Dominions Office to the 
Treasury in September 1944, carried a price tag of $100 million. The Treasury 
made it clear that no dollars would be available for Newfoundland; whereupon 
one of Neary's central figures, P.A. Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office, was 
sent to Ottawa in September 1945, to see what the Canadian attitude to New-
foundland might be. Both Neary and MacKenzie see this meeting as of pivotal 
importance, since the end result was an Anglo-Canadian understanding that the 
incorporation of Newfoundland into the Dominion would be the aim of both 
governments. The two authors, however, approach and therefore interpret the 
meeting in rather different ways, which illustrates the divergent yet complemen-
tary character of the two books. 
For Neary, the meeting was "Clutterbuck's triumph" (p. 232). As the latter 
reported to his superiors, the Canadians "admitted frankly that they had been 
drifting before with no clear policy and were delighted that they now had a 
definite object to aim at". Thus in Neary's account, it is the skilled and urbane 
Clutterbuck who talks the Canadian officials present — Robertson and Wrong 
among them — around to a position advantageous to a Britain anxious, since it 
could not afford to bankroll Newfoundland, to unload it. British policy between 
1942 and 1945, Neary concludes, "showed great foresight. Of all the players in a 
12 For other reviews of Walsh, see David MacKenzie, "Three Sides of the Same Coin: Some Recent 
Literature on Canada-Newfoundland Relations in the 1940s", Newfoundland Studies IV, 1 
(1988), pp. 99-104; and my review in Newfoundland Quarterly, LXXXII, 2 (1986), pp. 44-6. 
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complex game, they remained the best informed and the most clever" (p. 240). 
Yet MacKenzie shows how senior officials at External Affairs had been discussing 
Newfoundland throughout the war, and that a strong sentiment in favour of 
confederation had emerged long before Clutterbuck's Ottawa visit. It was 
consistent with this attitude that they would have opposed any suggestion that 
Canada find the dollars to pay for the Commission's reconstruction plan, which 
is where the talks with Clutterbuck began. If Canadian policy was unclear, it was 
surely because Canada was unaware of Britain's intentions. Clutterbuck, in fact, 
was pushing at an open door. Necessarily Canada had played the junior role, but 
as MacKenzie argues, "it was an essential one. They opened the door on 
Confederation just enough to permit the British to make union with Canada 
their goal. Without Canadian acquiescence, no action along this line would have 
been possible" (p. 163). 
The extent of Canadian interest in and commitment to Newfoundland can be 
gauged from the three bulky volumes of Documents on Relations between 
Canada and Newfoundland, 1935-1949, published by External Affairs and 
edited by P.A. Bridle, once stationed at the High Commission in St. John's.13 
The first volume deals with defence, civil aviation and economic affairs; the 
second, in two parts, with confederation (1940-49). This admirable collection, 
which will remain a standard source for those interested in this subject and 
period, gives firm support to MacKenzie's contention that, having established a 
foothold on the island and spent $65 million, the Canadians were concerned to 
maintain their influence there, particularly in view of the substantial American 
presence. As Bridle has written elsewhere, he and other officials were convinced 
in 1946 that "if Canada did not open its doors to Newfoundland, before long — 
in one way or another — the United States would".14 It has to be admitted, 
though, that if officials in External Affairs were firm in their opinions, Mackenzie 
King was characteristically prone to vacillation — welcoming the role of father 
of confederation while fearing its impact on federal-provincial relations — and 
needed periodic reinforcement from Jack Pickersgill and others. 
There were no such hesitations in London. The National Convention, pilloried as 
a betrayal by supporters of a return to responsible government (and by Bren 
Walsh), met in September 1946, and adjourned in January 1948. The British 
played their part by preventing substantive discussions on forms of closer 
relationships with the USA, by giving a stern and frosty reception to the delegation 
13 P.A. Bridle, ed., Documents on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland. Volume 1, 
1935-1949. Defence, Civil Aviation and Economic Affairs (Ottawa, Department of External 
Affairs, 1974); Volume 2, Confederation (two parts, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, 
1984). 
14 P.A. Bridle, "Canada, the US and Newfoundland, 1946,48", International Perspectives 
(Nov.-Dec. 1983), pp. 20-2. 
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which traipsed over to London, and by ensuring that confederation appeared on 
the referendum ballot. The Canadians did theirs by rolling out the red carpet for 
the Ottawa delegation, by eventually offering generous terms of union, and by 
encouraging the small confederate band. Neither MacKenzie nor Neary view the 
Convention as being of great importance. But no matter what one may think of 
the quality of its debates and reports, and despite the fact that the British 
government rejected its recommendation that confederation not be placed on 
the ballot, the Convention in fact served an essential purpose. It revived political 
debate after 12 years of Commission rule; it performed a much needed educational 
function; and it allowed confederation to be discussed at length and in detail.15 It 
was, moreover, the making of Joe Smallwood, and proved to be his springboard 
into a long and controversial public career. 
There followed the two referenda, the recriminations, the negotiation of the 
final terms of union, and the ceremonies to mark the extinction of a country and 
the birth of a province, all of which can be followed in the books under review. 
For Neary, the result was a victory for British diplomacy: "the United Kingdom 
had arranged her departure from Newfoundland with a hard logic and clinical 
precision she would not always manage in other parts of her far-flung but now 
crumbling empire" (p. 359). There are two questions to be raised about this 
interpretation. The first is how far the Newfoundland episode can be seen as part 
of the withdrawal from empire — the "business of going out of business" (p. 
240). I think it can, but it should be remembered that the British Labour 
government of 1945-51 did not adopt a policy of immediate or even rapid 
decolonisation. Its policy was Fabian-inspired and stressed gradualism and 
trusteeship — after all, the empire still had considerable value, particularly those 
parts of it within the sterling area. At the same time the British recognised that 
certain imperial realities had to be faced. Hence the disengagement from India, 
Burma, Ceylon — and from Newfoundland, where the anomaly of Commission 
government had to go, where the exchange problem made a trusteeship policy 
impossible, and where immediate independence was judged to be undesirable. 
The solution was federation, a favourite British device, and it might be argued 
that the Newfoundland case anticipated the federations which were to be 
engineered, though without lasting success, in the West Indies and south central 
Africa. 
The second question is whether Neary gives too much credit, throughout the 
book, to the Whitehall mandarins, their plans "expressed in taut Oxbridge 
English and flowing from one well-crafted position paper to another" (p. 40). 
The Amulree royal commission and the suspension of responsible government, 
15 See J.A. Webb, "Newfoundland's National Convention, 1946-48", M.A. thesis, Memorial 
University, 1987. 
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for instance, might be interpreted as a quick and clever manoever to fix the debt 
problem, rather than the result of careful and confident planning. And the 
episode of the wartime reconstruction plan leaves one astonished that men so 
allegedly clever as the civil servants at the Dominions Office could have expected 
the Treasury to find 100 million scarce postwar dollars for Newfoundland. The 
Treasury's reaction, it might be argued, brought the Dominions Office back to 
reality. It had to scramble to find another policy, which was conveniently 
provided by the Canadian officials who first murmured the word "confedera-
tion" to the smooth Mr. Clutterbuck. Finally, one should never forget that the 
success of British policy in Newfoundland was a close-run thing. Smallwood 
won the referendum by a narrow majority, and would probably have lost if his 
opponents had been better organised. 
Whether or not the mandarins were so fully in command as Neary suggests, 
his book provides a full, detailed and extremely valuable account of the Com-
mission period. He has given us the view from Whitehall and Government 
House. MacKenzie has provided the view from Ottawa and the High Commis-
sion in St. John's.16 What we need now is the view from, shall we say, the 
common room at Memorial University College, the City Club, the Orange Hall 
at Joe Batt's Arm and the Big Dipper bar in Gander — perspectives that might 
explain how Smallwood did his "pretty good job of engineering". We need a 
history of Newfoundland in the Commission period which will explain the 
socio-economic factors which allowed confederation to become a realistic and 
widely-supported constitutional option by 1946, and which will closely examine 
the events of the two referenda. Senator F.W Rowe's recent volume, Into the 
Breach: Memoirs of a Newfoundland Senator (Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 
1988), gives some leads that future scholars might follow. His interesting account 
of growing up in Lewisporte in the twenties mentions books and magazines 
arriving from the mainland, constant contact with relatives in mainland cities, 
the popularity of the Family Herald and the Maple Leaf Club, and the importance 
of the Newfoundland Methodist Church becoming part of the United Church of 
Canada. Since Memorial University College did not grant degrees until the 
1950s, Rowe had to finish his education on the mainland, and he describes how 
many of his fellow teachers were, like himself, confederates. Rowe's upbringing 
as an outport Protestant can be contrasted with that of the urban Roman 
Catholic, William J. Browne, whose first volume of memoirs ends in 1949.17 
16 For a review of MacKenzie by Melvin Baker, see Newfoundland Studies, 4, 1 (1988), pp. 
113-6. 
17 W.J. Browne, Eighty-four Years a Newfoundlander. Volume I, 1897-1949 (St. John's, 1981). See 
the review by Margaret Conrad, "Ego and Autobiography: Three Political Memoirs", Acadiensis, 
XVI, 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 152-3. 
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Browne's orientation was towards Europe and New England rather than 
towards Canada, and he was a faithful member of a church whose hierarchy was 
openly opposed to union. His is a useful account from the anticonfederate 
trenches. That he lost and Rowe and his party won might perhaps be explained 
by a symbolic incident on a St. John's wharf in the late 1940s. An elderly official 
was watching schooners from northern outharbours load up with supplies; he 
was heard to mutter in disbelief as he turned away, "Asparagus tips! Tinned 
pineapple chunks!" 
The publications mentioned in this article have added immensely to our 
understanding of Newfoundland's experience in the 1930s and 1940s, though 
further work will be needed before a full synthesis is possible. Equally, more 
research is needed on some aspects of the country's political history prior to 
1934. But the period is coming into focus, slowly perhaps, since like constitu-
tional history, political history is hardly fashionable. Would the process be 
speeded up by a conference in Edinburgh two years hence on Atlantic Region 
political history? It might be worth a try. 
JAMES K. HILLER 
Ethnic Studies in Atlantic Canada: 
Or, Some Ethnics are More 
Ethnic than Others 
THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY CONTINUES TO be one of the growth industries of 
Canadian scholarship, both academic and nonacademic branches. Increasingly 
in recent years, however, it has become clear that ethnic study is not a peculiarly 
Canadian phenomenon, but has a substantial international dimension. A 
recognition of ethnicity as an important human variable is, of course, not 
entirely of recent origin. Earlier generations studied ethnicity (calling it something 
else) under several rubrics. Much of the travel literature of the past dealt with the 
different customs of people to be found in exotic places, and with the rise of 
nationalism at the end of the 18th century, a good deal of ethnic analysis — 
however simplistic — went into the creation and promulgation of "nations" and 
"peoples" as the basis for new political reorganization of older outmoded states 
and empires. 
The new ethnic studies share something in common with their historical 
ancestors, but their rationale has become much more complex, ranging along a 
very interesting continuum. That continuum begins on one side, perhaps, with 
the needs of the particular ethnic group itself for identity, recognition, and 
acceptance. Ethnic group identity in the Canadian context normally implies 
